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Hacked Event Broadcast

Live source archive

Verified blockchain security incidents with original evidence and historical event dates.

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Historical events use their original event dates. Latest event dates first. Severity follows existing archive classifications.

Oct 18, 2026

1 verified update
AlpsCon AI Trade Hub on BNB Chain was exploited. An attacker used the publicly known private key of a Hardhat default test account that had remained on the KYC whitelist for ~14 months, executed code via EIP-7702, flash-loaned USDC to buy and stake ALPS, and exploited a reward accounting bug (fresh stake treated as historical to claim accumulated rewards), netting ~$152K USDC after repaying the loan.ExpandCollapse

AlpsCon AI Trade Hub on BNB Chain was exploited. An attacker used the publicly known private key of a Hardhat default test account that had remained on the KYC whitelist for ~14 months, executed code via EIP-7702, flash-loaned USDC to buy and stake ALPS, and exploited a reward accounting bug (fresh stake treated as historical to claim accumulated rewards), netting ~$152K USDC after repaying the loan.

Amount of loss
$ 152,809
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
BSC EcosystemSecurity

Oct 17, 2026

1 verified update
An attacker exploited insufficient randomness in some Qubic wallet seed generation (affecting seeds created in any browser on iPhone/iPad, Safari on Mac before Oct 18, 2026, or the Qubic iOS app before July 2025), draining approximately 2.94 trillion QU (~$1.3 million) from 1,404 wallets. The issue was in seed generation, not the Qubic protocol. The network was halted, most funds frozen, and seed generation fixed in version 4.26.4.ExpandCollapse

An attacker exploited insufficient randomness in some Qubic wallet seed generation (affecting seeds created in any browser on iPhone/iPad, Safari on Mac before Oct 18, 2026, or the Qubic iOS app before July 2025), draining approximately 2.94 trillion QU (~$1.3 million) from 1,404 wallets. The issue was in seed generation, not the Qubic protocol. The network was halted, most funds frozen, and seed generation fixed in version 4.26.4.

Amount of loss
$ 1,300,000
Attack method
Private Key Leakage
WalletSecurity

Oct 16, 2026

1 verified update
The Affluent DeFi protocol on the TON chain experienced an unbacked minting incident classified under token and share accounting, resulting in a loss of approximately $1,053,000 due to a smart contract vulnerability.ExpandCollapse

The Affluent DeFi protocol on the TON chain experienced an unbacked minting incident classified under token and share accounting, resulting in a loss of approximately $1,053,000 due to a smart contract vulnerability.

Amount of loss
$ 1,053,000
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
OtherSecurity

Oct 14, 2026

2 verified updates
A transaction validation vulnerability in Pirate Chain source code allowed the unauthorized creation of approximately 39.8 million ARRR, increasing the total supply by about 20%. The newly minted funds were transferred into the Sapling shielded pool. NonKYC identified suspicious deposits, restricted the associated accounts, and blocked withdrawals. The exploit combined two validation failures: bypassing the issuance check and incorrect interpretation of the output scripts. dPoW operators suspended notarizations as a precaution, and exchanges/pools were asked to pause operations while a recovery plan is developed.ExpandCollapse

A transaction validation vulnerability in Pirate Chain source code allowed the unauthorized creation of approximately 39.8 million ARRR, increasing the total supply by about 20%. The newly minted funds were transferred into the Sapling shielded pool. NonKYC identified suspicious deposits, restricted the associated accounts, and blocked withdrawals. The exploit combined two validation failures: bypassing the issuance check and incorrect interpretation of the output scripts. dPoW operators suspended notarizations as a precaution, and exchanges/pools were asked to pause operations while a recovery plan is developed.

Amount of loss
$ 10,746,000
Attack method
Transaction Validation Vulnerability
OtherSecurity
UNCX Network’s Smart Token Vesting V2 contracts were exploited across multiple chains (Ethereum, BNB Chain, Base, and Robinhood Chain). Attackers used a sequence of public vesting actions (release and cancel) that created discrepancies between pooled token balances and recorded shares, allowing attacker-controlled positions to withdraw more assets than entitled. Approximately 10 tokens and 11 transactions were involved. Early estimates put losses at about $1.49M; the project later confirmed roughly $807K–$808K in realized extracted value, with about $58K recovered by whitehats.ExpandCollapse

UNCX Network’s Smart Token Vesting V2 contracts were exploited across multiple chains (Ethereum, BNB Chain, Base, and Robinhood Chain). Attackers used a sequence of public vesting actions (release and cancel) that created discrepancies between pooled token balances and recorded shares, allowing attacker-controlled positions to withdraw more assets than entitled. Approximately 10 tokens and 11 transactions were involved. Early estimates put losses at about $1.49M; the project later confirmed roughly $807K–$808K in realized extracted value, with about $58K recovered by whitehats.

Amount of loss
$ 807,000
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
ETH EcosystemSecurity

Oct 13, 2026

1 verified update
Crypto gambling platform Gamdom was attacked on October 13, 2026, due to an unauthorized server connection, resulting in approximately $4.2 million stolen from hot wallets. The incident affected multiple blockchains; the platform went offline for investigation and moved remaining hot wallet funds to cold storage.ExpandCollapse

Crypto gambling platform Gamdom was attacked on October 13, 2026, due to an unauthorized server connection, resulting in approximately $4.2 million stolen from hot wallets. The incident affected multiple blockchains; the platform went offline for investigation and moved remaining hot wallet funds to cold storage.

Amount of loss
$ 4,208,000
Attack method
Hot Wallet Server Compromise
WalletSecurity

Oct 10, 2026

1 verified update
Papertrade, a synthetic perpetuals platform with up to 1000x leverage built on Hyperliquid’s HyperEVM, suffered a ~$1.28 million loss about 8 hours after its Oct. 10, 2026 launch. A wallet moved ETH prices on Hyperliquid (via large buys/sells) while holding highly leveraged positions on Papertrade that settled against the manipulated BBO midpoint, extracting profits from the platform’s shared USDC liquidity pool. Papertrade attributed it to overly permissive open-interest limits at launch and tightened them.ExpandCollapse

Papertrade, a synthetic perpetuals platform with up to 1000x leverage built on Hyperliquid’s HyperEVM, suffered a ~$1.28 million loss about 8 hours after its Oct. 10, 2026 launch. A wallet moved ETH prices on Hyperliquid (via large buys/sells) while holding highly leveraged positions on Papertrade that settled against the manipulated BBO midpoint, extracting profits from the platform’s shared USDC liquidity pool. Papertrade attributed it to overly permissive open-interest limits at launch and tightened them.

Amount of loss
$ 1,280,000
Attack method
Price Manipulation
ETH EcosystemSecurity

Oct 9, 2026

2 verified updates
BitBay’s Polygon DAI/USDC vault, UsdcDaiV4Vault, was exploited. The attacker first called reposition() to force the vault’s liquidity to zero, then redeemed only one minimal share. Because _withdraw() sends the contract’s entire token balance when liquidity == 0 instead of the user’s proportional share, about 14,838.47 DAI (roughly $14,000) was drained.ExpandCollapse

BitBay’s Polygon DAI/USDC vault, UsdcDaiV4Vault, was exploited. The attacker first called reposition() to force the vault’s liquidity to zero, then redeemed only one minimal share. Because _withdraw() sends the contract’s entire token balance when liquidity == 0 instead of the user’s proportional share, about 14,838.47 DAI (roughly $14,000) was drained.

Amount of loss
$ 14,000
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
Polygon EcosystemSecurity
EtherVista’s liquidity pool was exploited due to an integer overflow in the K-invariant check inside EtherVistaPair.swap(). Both reserves are uint112, so their product can wrap around and the check can pass even when the real reserve product drops sharply. The attacker registered a self-controlled contract as an authorized router and ran two crafted swaps to drain WETH and VISTA, with a loss of about $18,600.ExpandCollapse

EtherVista’s liquidity pool was exploited due to an integer overflow in the K-invariant check inside EtherVistaPair.swap(). Both reserves are uint112, so their product can wrap around and the check can pass even when the real reserve product drops sharply. The attacker registered a self-controlled contract as an authorized router and ran two crafted swaps to drain WETH and VISTA, with a loss of about $18,600.

Amount of loss
$ 18600
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
ExchangeSecurity

Oct 8, 2026

1 verified update
An attacker exploited an accounting bug in X7Pioneer’s claimRewards(). The function adds address(this).balance - lastETHBalance to totalRewards on every call, but updates lastETHBalance only when claimable > 0. An empty array leaves claimable at 0, so the same unaccounted balance is added repeatedly and inflates per-token rewards. The attacker donated ETH to widen the delta, then drained about 6.78 ETH.ExpandCollapse

An attacker exploited an accounting bug in X7Pioneer’s claimRewards(). The function adds address(this).balance - lastETHBalance to totalRewards on every call, but updates lastETHBalance only when claimable > 0. An empty array leaves claimable at 0, so the same unaccounted balance is added repeatedly and inflates per-token rewards. The attacker donated ETH to widen the delta, then drained about 6.78 ETH.

Amount of loss
$ 16,514
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
ETH EcosystemSecurity

Oct 7, 2026

1 verified update
79th Vault (79AU token) on BNB Chain was attacked due to a compromise of the operator’s private key. The attacker used a privileged OPERATOR_ROLE-only function in the token contract (which allowed moving 79AU directly out of the PancakeSwap 79AU/USDT pair and calling sync()) to extract about 2.01 million 79AU in multiple transactions within roughly one hour, then sold them back into the pool to drain USDT and convert proceeds into about 16,249 BNB (~$12.5 million loss; pool USDT reserves fell from ~$15.2M to ~$3.9M). The project revoked the role, applied emergency fixes, and later recovered ~15,000 BNB via white-hat negotiations.ExpandCollapse

79th Vault (79AU token) on BNB Chain was attacked due to a compromise of the operator’s private key. The attacker used a privileged OPERATOR_ROLE-only function in the token contract (which allowed moving 79AU directly out of the PancakeSwap 79AU/USDT pair and calling sync()) to extract about 2.01 million 79AU in multiple transactions within roughly one hour, then sold them back into the pool to drain USDT and convert proceeds into about 16,249 BNB (~$12.5 million loss; pool USDT reserves fell from ~$15.2M to ~$3.9M). The project revoked the role, applied emergency fixes, and later recovered ~15,000 BNB via white-hat negotiations.

Amount of loss
$ 12,500,000
Attack method
Private Key Leakage
BSC EcosystemSecurity

Oct 6, 2026

3 verified updates
Two legacy Set Protocol products (ETHEMAAPY and ETHMACOAPY) were exploited due to an upward rounding vulnerability in the actualizeFee() function. Attackers used the bug to inflate share value even when no fee was charged, then issued and redeemed shares to extract excess collateral, resulting in losses of approximately $50k.ExpandCollapse

Two legacy Set Protocol products (ETHEMAAPY and ETHMACOAPY) were exploited due to an upward rounding vulnerability in the actualizeFee() function. Attackers used the bug to inflate share value even when no fee was charged, then issued and redeemed shares to extract excess collateral, resulting in losses of approximately $50k.

Amount of loss
$ 50,000
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
OtherSecurity
A Tornado Cash-funded address called an unprotected drain function on a dormant MakerDAO ETH-A liquidation keeper. The upgradeable proxy had won auctions #1457–1460 in 2020 (200 WETH total) but never called deal(), leaving the collateral in the Flipper. The attacker called deal(), moved the collateral to the keeper via Vat.flux, then used GemJoin.exit() to withdraw 200 WETH to an attacker-chosen address and unwrap it to ETH. The flaw was in the third-party keeper, not MakerDAO core.ExpandCollapse

A Tornado Cash-funded address called an unprotected drain function on a dormant MakerDAO ETH-A liquidation keeper. The upgradeable proxy had won auctions #1457–1460 in 2020 (200 WETH total) but never called deal(), leaving the collateral in the Flipper. The attacker called deal(), moved the collateral to the keeper via Vat.flux, then used GemJoin.exit() to withdraw 200 WETH to an attacker-chosen address and unwrap it to ETH. The flaw was in the third-party keeper, not MakerDAO core.

Amount of loss
$ 538000
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
ETH EcosystemSecurity
The attacker abused Set Protocol’s actualizeFee(). Even though no fee was minted, the function rounded unitShares upward from 4,927 to 4,928. The attacker issued shares before the update and redeemed the same quantity afterward, extracting extra collateral from the rounding-induced unit increase. Uniswap v4 flash accounting supplied temporary liquidity to scale the exploit.ExpandCollapse

The attacker abused Set Protocol’s actualizeFee(). Even though no fee was minted, the function rounded unitShares upward from 4,927 to 4,928. The attacker issued shares before the update and redeemed the same quantity afterward, extracting extra collateral from the rounding-induced unit increase. Uniswap v4 flash accounting supplied temporary liquidity to scale the exploit.

Amount of loss
$ 13,700
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
OtherSecurity

Oct 5, 2026

1 verified update
Web3 financial platform Based discovered that an unauthorized third party had accessed an internal dashboard used to manage the Based Visa Card program and contained the incident shortly after detection. KYC data collected by the card issuer for some cardholders (including name, ID/passport number, date of birth, and address) may have been obtained. Card numbers, CVV, PIN, ID photos, liveness records, the Based Wallet, and card funds were not affected, and cards continue to work normally. Affected users were notified by email, authorities were informed, and users were warned about phishing and social-engineering risks.ExpandCollapse

Web3 financial platform Based discovered that an unauthorized third party had accessed an internal dashboard used to manage the Based Visa Card program and contained the incident shortly after detection. KYC data collected by the card issuer for some cardholders (including name, ID/passport number, date of birth, and address) may have been obtained. Card numbers, CVV, PIN, ID photos, liveness records, the Based Wallet, and card funds were not affected, and cards continue to work normally. Affected users were notified by email, authorities were informed, and users were warned about phishing and social-engineering risks.

Attack method
Unauthorized Access to Internal Systems
WalletSecurity

Oct 3, 2026

2 verified updates
An attacker exploited a logic flaw in MALT’s swap function. With negligible input they triggered an external rebalanceHook that pulled DAI from the protocol’s Capital Source into the same pool. The swap then checked its invariant against the post-hook balances and treated the treasury-funded DAI as caller-supplied funds, allowing a disproportionate MALT withdrawal and a loss of about $ 72,000.ExpandCollapse

An attacker exploited a logic flaw in MALT’s swap function. With negligible input they triggered an external rebalanceHook that pulled DAI from the protocol’s Capital Source into the same pool. The swap then checked its invariant against the post-hook balances and treated the treasury-funded DAI as caller-supplied funds, allowing a disproportionate MALT withdrawal and a loss of about $ 72,000.

Amount of loss
$ 13,440.58
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
OtherSecurity
An attacker exploited a logic flaw in MALT’s swap function. With negligible input they triggered an external rebalanceHook that pulled DAI from the protocol’s Capital Source into the same pool. The swap then checked its invariant against the post-hook balances and treated the treasury-funded DAI as caller-supplied funds, allowing a disproportionate MALT withdrawal and a loss of about $ 72,000.ExpandCollapse

An attacker exploited a logic flaw in MALT’s swap function. With negligible input they triggered an external rebalanceHook that pulled DAI from the protocol’s Capital Source into the same pool. The swap then checked its invariant against the post-hook balances and treated the treasury-funded DAI as caller-supplied funds, allowing a disproportionate MALT withdrawal and a loss of about $ 72,000.

Amount of loss
$ 72000
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
OtherSecurity

Oct 2, 2026

2 verified updates
On Base, an attacker exploited GoldPesa’s GPXHooks. The hook rebalanced through a shared, flash-accounted PositionManager without checking that the GPX/USDC currency deltas were zero. The attacker opened an unlock, minted an unsettled WETH/USDC position (about 115,000 USDC of phantom debt), then swapped on the GPX pool to trigger the hourly reBalance. The hook’s burn credit was netted against that debt, and the attacker burned its own position and withdrew about 114,900 USDC from the PoolManager.ExpandCollapse

On Base, an attacker exploited GoldPesa’s GPXHooks. The hook rebalanced through a shared, flash-accounted PositionManager without checking that the GPX/USDC currency deltas were zero. The attacker opened an unlock, minted an unsettled WETH/USDC position (about 115,000 USDC of phantom debt), then swapped on the GPX pool to trigger the hourly reBalance. The hook’s burn credit was netted against that debt, and the attacker burned its own position and withdrew about 114,900 USDC from the PoolManager.

Amount of loss
$ 114900
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
OtherSecurity
Microsoft’s official X account was accessed without authorization for about 30 minutes. Attackers changed the profile picture to Clippy, followed and reposted an impersonator account, and promoted an unauthorized Clippy meme coin to roughly 13 million followers; a later “apology” post was also unauthorized and deleted. Microsoft told The Verge and others that the account was secured, the posts removed, and that it never authorized any token tied to Clippy or $MSFT.ExpandCollapse

Microsoft’s official X account was accessed without authorization for about 30 minutes. Attackers changed the profile picture to Clippy, followed and reposted an impersonator account, and promoted an unauthorized Clippy meme coin to roughly 13 million followers; a later “apology” post was also unauthorized and deleted. Microsoft told The Verge and others that the account was secured, the posts removed, and that it never authorized any token tied to Clippy or $MSFT.

Attack method
The X account was hacked
OtherSecurity

Oct 1, 2026

2 verified updates
The attacker exploited an access-control vulnerability in FlashLoopAdapter by spoofing Safe authentication and bypassing the module authorization check. By controlling the swapRouter and swapCalldata, the attacker targeted the victim Safes with execTransactionFromModule() and executed unauthorized transactions. The attacker also used a Morpho WETH flash loan to repay the affected Safe’s Aave V3 debt and unlock its collateral, ultimately draining weETH from two Safes and retaining approximately 114.09 ETH, worth about $305,000.ExpandCollapse

The attacker exploited an access-control vulnerability in FlashLoopAdapter by spoofing Safe authentication and bypassing the module authorization check. By controlling the swapRouter and swapCalldata, the attacker targeted the victim Safes with execTransactionFromModule() and executed unauthorized transactions. The attacker also used a Morpho WETH flash loan to repay the affected Safe’s Aave V3 debt and unlock its collateral, ultimately draining weETH from two Safes and retaining approximately 114.09 ETH, worth about $305,000.

Amount of loss
$ 305,000
Attack method
Smart Contract Vulnerability
ETH EcosystemSecurity